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Many studies have examined the direct relationship between stock incentive and 
firm performance. But they got inconsistent results. The reasons rest with most of 
these studies focused on the direct relationship between stock incentive and 
performance, and they ignored the interior mechanism inside the different interior 
mechanism. So the most important thing is which interior mechanism influences the 
result of stock incentive. This paper tries to research the question. 
This paper examined stock incentive in new point of view of the interior 
mechanism, and answered two questions that were important to stock incentive: (1) 
what are the key factors that affect validity of stock incentive? (2)What are the key 
factors we should consider when we set up a stock incentive mechanism? 
The interior mechanism could divide into two parts: incentive and constraint. 
People's motivation roots in compare between people. Their behavior based on these 
judgments. So this paper researched incentive factor in the following tow aspects:   
(1) the equity of managers in the same level, i.e. horizontal equity. The empirical 
results show that the relation between horizontal equity and firm performance is 
positive; (2) the gap between managers of different levels. The empirical results show 
that enlarging the gap could improve firm performance. As to the constraint to 
managers, this paper suggest binding managers’ income to firm performance and 
making managers’ income equal to their risks. The incentive mode without constraint 
might be inefficient. We should take these factors into account when setting up stock 
incentive mechanism.    
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上市公司建立、健全激励与约束机制，证券会于 2005 年 11 月 15 日发布了《上











































尽管舆论对 MBO 意见不一，但中国企业对 MBO 依然保持热度不减。仅在
几年前，MBO 在中国还是新鲜事。人们谈及 MBO 案例，无非北京四通、深圳
方大、宇通客车、粤美的等屈指可数的几个案例。从 2002 年的“只做不说”、台






































大课题。2002 年 6 月的世界通信事件，“彻底打击了投资者对（美国）资本市场
的信心”（Congress report,2002）。以 2002 年 12 月 20 日《人民日报》所评出的
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